AWvAR: Regan's rights view

Regan's rights view

In The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 1983), Tom Regan of North Carolin State University explores the implications of applying a true rights view to our treatment of animals. Following is a brief summary of his position and why he thinks it is the true philosophical basis for the more abolitionist animal rights movement.

1) Rejects utilitarian justifications for harming individuals with moral rights.

Regan agrees with the standard criticisms of utilitarian views.

2) Conceives of harm in terms of diminution in the capacity to form and satisfy desires or preferences.

Regan agrees that it makes more sense to conceive of happiness in terms of preference- or desire-satisfaction rather than hedonistically.

3) Argues that if all (or nearly all) humans have moral rights, then some non-human animals do too.

This is a version of the argument from marginal cases which was described earlier: he argues that there is no basis for attributing rights to marginal humans which would not also apply to many animals.

4) Calls for "the total dissolution of" commercial animal agriculture, experimentation, and hunting.

Regan claims that his rights view is the real philosophical basis for the abolitionist claims of many animal rights advocates, because although utilitarians could endorse various harmful practices under at least certain circumstances, if animals have moral rights, then you could not justify those harms in purely utilitarian terms.

Regan on conflicting rights

Notice that on Regan's view there is basically one moral right, the right not to be harmed on purely utilitarian grounds. To "have moral rights" for Regan is to have this one basic right.

Where it is impossible to avoid harming individuals, Regan endorses two principles for deciding whose rights to override:

The Miniride Principle: Where comparable harms are involved, override the fewest individuals' rights.
The Worse-off Principle: Where non-comparable harms are involved, avoid harming the worse-off individual.

For illustrations of these principles' application, click here.

Regan on harm

Obviously Regan owes us an analysis of what harm amounts to. He defines harm in terms of diminution in the capacity to form and satisfy desires.

One implication of this analysis is, as he emphasizes, that the harm that death is to a normal, adult human is non-comparably worse than the harm that death is to any non-human animal.

For an illustration of this point, click here.

Regan's analysis of harm, coupled with his worse-off principle, might imply that some medical research is justifiable, even on his strict animal rights position.