VI. Volitional Arguments for Religious Belief: Arguments that depend on the passions, not the intellect.

• William James: according to the pragmatic theory of meaning, a sentence is meaningful only if believing it would make a practical difference in one's life.  The pragmatic theory of truth says that a belief is true insofar as it helps us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience: truth is what works.  So in contrast to Hume, Russell, and Clifford (who say that we should limit belief to what we have evidence for), James says that, practically speaking, we make judgments all the time based on insufficient evidence, and we do not think that such judgments are unjustified.  Our passional nature commits us to making choices where the options are genuine (forced, momentous, live) and where no intellectual grounds are sufficient to indicate what ought to be done.

Belief in the existence of God is something that the intellect cannot decide.  But because such a belief can make a major difference in how one lives, a choice (or volition) must be made, one that because of the situation would be a justified (i.e., meaningful) decision.  The belief in God's existence "works" (and thus is true) if it satisfies our expectations and is consistent with other beliefs.  The question about whether there is a God, then, is not really the issue; what is more important is whether one should believe there is.  And that is what James is interested in.
 

• Religious Mysticism (e.g., St. Teresa of Avila): belief in God cannot be thought, because God is beyond thought.  Some people try to prove God's existence based on (1) the testimony of others (e.g., parents), (2) experience of the world, or even (3) abstract arguments or proofs.  But the mystic knows that God exists without having to prove it, because (4) a mystical experience is itself proof that there is something beyond the world and ourselves.  In a mystical experience a person is transformed, identified with God: one's self is lost and replaced by union with God.
• Søren Kierkegaard: religious beliefs are beliefs, not objective bits of knowledge.  The confrontation with, and anguish (angst) over, the ambiguity of human existence--what is its point if one is going to die anyway?--raises the prospect of the meaninglessness of one's existence.  Since no convincing arguments can be given to justify existence itself, the only proper (i.e., authentic) response is unconditioned faith, belief that there is a God who has promised us his salvation.

Abraham is the embodiment of the religious mentality.  He is not great because he is willing to sacrifice what he loves most but because he acts not knowing (in fear and trembling) whether he is right but nonetheless believes that this is what God asks of him.  Indeed, humanly speaking, he is insane because his act is unintelligible and even contradicts what God has told him to expect as the father of a great nation: he acted "by virtue of the absurd."  That is, he took responsibility for his action, affirming his power rather than engaging in (Freudian) resignation.