Notes for Class Eight: Deontological Ethical Theories

I.Divine Law Theory: we ought to do X or avoid doing X because it is what God says we should do. The important point here is that the reason why we are supposed to act in certain ways is not because doing what God says to do will make us happy or be in accord with our natures (as in Natural Law Theory). Rather, according to divine law theory, the reason why we should act in certain ways is because it is our duty to obey God's law, regardless of whether the consequences make us happy or are in accord with our nature.

II. Kantian Formalism: the reason why an action is good is that it is the right thing to do. That which is right is that which we ought to do, that which is our duty to do, regardless of the consequences of our doing it. We ought to do--that is, we are morally "obligated" to do--only those things that are universally binding. A moral command ("you ought to do X") is binding only if it has the form of a command (or "imperative") that admits of no exceptions. If I am morally obligated to act in a certain way, then so is every other rational being. So to determine whether a certain way of acting is morally good, we need to determine whether that way of acting can be universalized. That is, we need to determine whether the command is categorical, admitting of no exceptions. A morally good person acts the way he/she does because it is the kind of act that every rational person is obligated to do; that is what it means for the action to be right. A morally good person acts out of respect for this universalizable character of certain ways of acting.

A. What is wrong with consequentialism:

(1) For the consequentialist, no act is right or wrong in itself. But that can't possibly be correct, since that would mean that there might be instances of horrible crimes that were "good." It would also allow us to treat people as means rather than ends in themselves.
(2) If we are already inclined to do an act because we naturally seek to produce good consequences (e.g., pleasure, happiness), then we are not acting freely and are therefore not morally responsible. A fundamental principle of ethics is: if you are morally obligated to do an action, you should be physically able to do it (that is, "ought implies can"). But if we are not free not to seek after happiness, then it makes no sense to say that we ought to seek happiness or anything else.
(3) Because of differences in their experiences and backgrounds, people differ as to what are good consequences; therefore, we can never achieve agreement on the end of moral behavior or on an ulitmate criterion for making such decisions.
(4) The consequences of our actions are often out of our control, so we cannot be held responsible for them or have our actions judged based on them.

B. Morality is not based on hypothetical imperatives (if you want X--where X is, for example, happiness--then do Y) but rather on a categorical imperative (you must do X, regardless of what you want). Because people differ in social and personal goals, their means to attaining those goals will differ as well. Morality, however, should be the kind of thing which does not vary from individual to individual, because otherwise there would be no point in providing a reason for behavior other than saying that way of acting is simply what one wants to do. In other words, morality and moral recommendations make sense only if giving reasons for one's actions makes sense. Because we are rational beings, we can give reasons for what we do and we can act based on those reasons (rather than acting simply because we want or desire to).

C. According to Kant, the fundamental rational principle of moral argument or reasoning is the categorical imperative: we should act only on rules (or "maxims") that we could will everyone else to adopt as well. The way to determine whether a particular way of acting is moral or immoral is to see whether it can be made into a universal principle of acting. Any way of acting that cannot be universalized, either in terms of logical consistency and/or universal acceptability is not morally good. (Note: This is different from the Golden Rule insofar as "doing unto others as you would have them do unto you" is based on desire for happiness; it emphasizes a rule utilitarian way of thinking instead focusing on Kant's point that universalizability is implicit in rational behavior.)

D. Being rational means being able to act based on motives that are universally defensible. To act as a human being is not to act as a slave to one's instincts or passions or as a result of social forces. Rather, acting in a morally responsible way means treating oneself and others as ends-in-themselves, not as means to an end. Human beings can act rationally, that is, out of respect for doing something because it is the rational thing to do: when they do this they are acting for the sake of doing their duty. That is what being moral means: doing something because it is what is required of a rational being. (This is also what Kant calls acting on the basis of a "good will.") Because we have control over only our intentions and motives, we can be morally obligated only in regard to what we intend to do, not the consequences of our actions. Though we may not be free to control the consequences of our actions, we are free ("autonomous") regarding what we intend to do. If we intend to do something that is morally obligating because it is our duty, we act in a morally good way.

E. Morality presumes the existence of rational persons. A society of autonomous, rational persons is a kingdom of ends, a society in which each individual has dignity, intrinsic worth, and is considered fully responsible for his or her choices in the making of universal law. The possibility for rationality makes humans morally significant.

Objections to Kant:

1. Situations often require us to make exceptions to what moral laws demand. There are always exceptions to moral laws due to the fact that moral requirements often conflict.
2. In testing the universalizability of ways of acting, one considers the consequences. Why not just use the consequences directly in determining moral value and obligation?