True/False

 1.  According to determinism, all actions except for truly human (free) actions are events that have specific causes for why they happen in the way they do.

 2. The freedom-determinism question is a metaphysical issue insofar as it acknowledges that there might be a difference between how human behavior appears and how it really is.

 3. Determinists believe that human behavior can be explained only if we think of it in the same law-governed ways in which we think of other things in nature.
 
 4. According to the determinist, human actions are determined to occur in exactly the way they do because they (like all other events) have specific causes.

 5. In hard determinism, freedom and determinism are incompatible because freedom would require that an action be uncaused.

 6. According to hard determinists like Skinner and Freud, even though people may be responsible for their actions, they should not be held responsible for their actions, because no one is ultimately free.

 7. B. F. Skinner claims that positive reinforcement is more effective in conditioning human behavior than negative reinforcement because human beings naturally seek happiness.
 
8. Hard determinism proposes that human beings cannot do what they want to do.

 9. Determinists argue that while most human choices and actions are caused to occur in exactly the way they do, the recognition that we are determined is itself uncaused and thus undetermined.

10. According to hard determinists, no human action is free, but human choices are free.

 11. Even though Freud is a hard determinist, he does admit that some acts are done freely if they are caused by unconscious drives, repressed memories, or anti-social urges.

 12. In Freudian psychoanalysis, impulses, memories, desires, and fears may determine our unconscious behavior, but on the level of consciousness (the ego) we are free to act any way we want.

 13. According to the soft determinist, a "free" action is caused by one's will or choice rather than by external forces, influences, or constraints.

14. Soft determinists claim that human actions can be free and determined at the same time.

  15. Soft determinists allow for the possibility of freedom by arguing, against hard determinists, that some of our actions (i.e., the free ones) do not have causes.

 16. Because soft determinists (as opposed to hard determinists) believe that some of our actions are free, they have to acknowledge that some of our actions are not caused or determined by anything.

 17.  The soft determinist claims that acting "freely" means acting as a result of choosing--that is, according to what one wills to do.

18. According to soft determinists (or "compatibilists"), human actions are free only if nothing causes them.

 19. In the Stoic, Spinozistic version of soft determinism, acknowledging that we are completely determined "frees" us from worry that things could have been otherwise.

 20. In Hume's soft determinism, freedom and determinism are compatible because they are necessarily the causes of one another.

  21. Passive soft (or self) determinists claim that freedom means being able to do what one wants to do and to determine what one wants.
 
 22. Hume claims that rewarding or punishing a person requires that we accept determinism insofar as we assume actions are caused by the person doing the act.

 23. Though determinists and indeterminists disagree on how to understand freedom, they agree that the way to study the issue is by focusing on the causes of acts rather than the reasons for which acts are done.

 24. Like hard and soft determinists, indeterminists argue that truly free actions are chance or random events.

 25.  The indeterminist claims that insofar as nothing causes human actions, those actions are free.

26. Indeterminists argue that a "free" person does things that a causally-determined person could not do.
 
 27. According to indeterminists, certain human acts are chance events--that is, specific causes do not determine them: they could have occurred otherwise.

 28. For libertarians real freedom consists in being able to act or choose differently in exactly the same circumstances and with exactly the same causal influences.

 29. According to the agency or person theory of freedom, since a free act cannot be caused by anything (not even by an agent or person), there is no such thing as a free act.

 30. Sartre argues that a person is ultimately free to act in the way she chooses, no matter what her personal inclinations or how she was raised.

 31. According to Sartre, to be existentially free means to be able to do or be anything, and to interpret the world in any way, regardless of our training or upbringing.

 32. According to Sartre, the choice to believe that we are not free and that we are determined by forces over which we have no control is itself a free choice.
 
 33. Though he says that we are "condemned to be free" and that we can "transcend" our social or personal situation, Sartre acknowledges that we are not always responsible for what we do.

 34. By saying that we are "condemned to be free," Sartre indicates how existentialism treats human beings as determined by external forces.

 35. According to Sartre, bad faith is self-contradictory because it involves the free choice by an individual to believe that he is not free.

 36. According to Camus, like Sisyphus we should commit ourselves to living in spite of life's absurdity.

 37. Kierkegaard agrees with Camus that, since existence is absurd and unjust, no one should place any faith in God.

 38. Ellis' rational-emotive therapy attempts to increase freedom by showing people the irrationality of some of their beliefs.
 
39. Capricious freedom is freedom based on insanity.

 40. Like the existentialist, the person who embodies perverse freedom challenges religious or moral values by acting in "bad faith."

41. To be insane is to be perversely free.

 42. To be free to do something can mean either to be free from restraints that interfere with the satisfaction of a desire or to have the ability to achieve some desired end, or perhaps both.

 43. Negative freedom is the freedom to be able to act without external interference.

 44. Positive freedom is the ability to do something which is made possible by someone's (e.g., society's) doing something (rather than not doing something).

 45. The positive notion of freedom--or "positive freedom"--is the ability to do something (e.g., achieve a desired goal) due to one's abilities or with help or guidance from someone else.

 46.  While so-called "negative" liberty refers to the freedom to do negative or evil acts, "positive" liberty refers to the ability to do good.
 

Multiple Choice

47. According to determinism, human choices and actions are like all other events in the universe, insofar as:
  (a) they are determined by specific causes to occur in exactly the way they do.
  (b) they have causes that are ultimately outside of nature (for example, God or fate) and therefore cannot be affected by human behavior.
  (c) we never have any idea about what causes them.
  (d) there is really nothing that ultimately causes them: they just "happen."

48. Determinism differs from predestination and fatalism insofar as it explains human behavior in terms of:
  (a) causes, not reasons.    (c) natural events, not supernatural events.
  (b) actions, not choices.    (d) the past, not the future.

49. According to proponents of hard determinism (e.g., Holbach), we think we are free (though really we are not) because:
 (a) we do not know the causes of our actions and thus assume our actions have no causes.
  (b) the causes of our actions are so complex that there really isn't any cause for our actions.
  (c) the choices we make are themselves uncaused, though actions based on the choices are determined.
  (d) everything that exists naturally is causally determined (including our thinking we are free).

50. Which IS NOT a point typically made by hard determinists to explain why we mistakenly believe we are free?
  (a) We like to believe we are different from the rest of nature.
  (b) We don't know all of the determining causes of our behavior.
  (c) We want to explain everything (including our behavior) in terms of laws of nature.
  (d) We think that if people are not free, they cannot justifiably be held responsible for their actions.

51. According to hard determinists such as Skinner, if human behavior is determined by causes, then it makes no sense to say that people are responsible for their actions.  But this does not imply that we are unjustified in holding someone responsible for their actions, since:
  (a) it is unfair to blame or praise someone for an action that he or she could not have chosen to do otherwise.
  (b) we are justifiably held responsible only for those actions for which we are responsible.
  (c) by holding someone responsible for an action, we cause the person to become more free (and thus to be more responsible) in the future.
  (d) holding someone responsible for an action can fulfill a social or political purpose even if the person could not have done otherwise.

52. Hard determinists argue that, just because people are not responsible for their actions, that does not mean that the rest of us can't hold them responsible for their actions.  They argue that by holding people responsible for their actions (e.g., through rewards, punishments, or psychological treatment), we:
  (a) are acting in an admittedly unjust and unfair manner, but that is what society dictates we must do.
  (b) respect people's freedom to act in any way whatsoever and give them what they deserve.
  (c) can exert other conditioning forces so that their lives are modified to be more useful and happy.
  (d) recognize that eros and thanatos cannot completely overwhelm our socially-instilled conscience (the super-ego) and the reality principle.

53. Theories of freedom and theories of punishment focus attention on the differences between being responsible and being held responsible for our actions.  In this regard, the theory of deterrence presumes a theory of hard determinism, insofar as (in deterrence) the purpose of punishment is:
  (a) to protect the society from dangerous individuals who freely choose to threaten others.
  (b) to change behavior by holding someone responsible even though he or she could not have done otherwise.
  (c) to hold responsible only those individuals who are responsible for their actions.
  (d) to deter individuals from unacceptable acts if they are responsible, and to indicate how they can learn to hold themselves responsible.

54. According to the hard determinist, human actions and choices, like everything else, are events that have specific and determining causes.  As to why people still believe in the "illusion" of freedom, the hard determinist gives a number of explanations.  Which of the following IS NOT one of those explanations?
  (a) People think that if they are like all other (determined) things in the universe, then they will no longer be able to claim any privileged moral or spiritual status.
 (b) People insist that they sometimes act without knowing why they do what they do.
  (c) People believe that while external forces (such as environment, upbringing, or genetics) can influence their behavior, such forces do not determine it.
  (d) People are ignorant of the complex influences and causes that determine their actions and choices.

55. If human beings are products of their environment and conditioning (as Skinner claims), how can they be held responsible for their actions (if they were not "free" to have done otherwise)?
  (a) It only seems that people are not free; in fact, they can change their behavior if they really want to, if they truly set their minds to it.
  (b) Even though human nature is determined genetically, we can take responsibility for our own genetic natures by affirming them as our own and taking credit for our actions.
  (c) Holding someone responsible for an action means reinforcing desirable behavior--not as a reward for past actions but to cause someone to act in desirable ways in the future.
  (d) The task of deterministic psychology is to recognize how the concepts of freedom and dignity have contributed to an improvement in the human condition by changing behaviors.

56. Which IS NOT a typical objection raised against Skinner's behavioristic form of hard determinism?
  (a) Behaviorism explains human actions and choices in terms of causes alone and ignores the possibility of explaining them in terms of reasons.
  (b) Behaviorism explains how all actions are determined but not how all human choices are free.
  (c) Behaviorism interprets human actions in terms of unreflective responses to stimuli instead of thoughtful consideration of options.
  (d) Behaviorism (like determinism in general) does not permit refutation and therefore cannot be considered an appropriate theory in the freedom-determinism debate.

57. For Stoics like Marcus Aurelius, freedom consists in realizing one's place in the universe and in conforming to the law of nature that governs the heavens, social structure, and even the parts of one's soul.  We are "free" only when we act according to "right reason."  To act in any other way would not be free because:
  (a) our actions would not really be "our" actions but rather the actions of other forces in nature.
 (b) the fatalism of Stoic philosophy rules out the possibility that anyone ever acts freely.
 (  c) right reason refers to how we think, not to how our thoughts match the world or how we act.
 (d) the more we learn about ourselves, the more we free ourselves from laws of nature.

58. Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
 (a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
 (b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
 (c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
 (d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

59. According to the version of soft determinism adopted by St. Augustine and Hume, even though all of our actions are caused by something, some of our acts can still be called free insofar as:
 (a) they are caused by our choices.  (b) God causes us to choose those actions.
 (c) our choices are not determined.  (d) choices form character or personality.

60. Which of the following IS NOT a version of soft determinism?
  (a) Though our actions are predetermined in virtue of God's foreknowledge, they are still free because (from our perspective) our decisions to act one way or another are up to us.
  (b) The knowledge that our acts are determined frees us from the anxiety of not being sure about whether our choices or actions are correct.
  (c) To the extent that our actions are determined by our choices, they are done freely.
  (d) Not only are our actions free when they result from our choices, but our choices as well are free insofar as they are not influenced by any other event.

61. Though both St. Augustine and Baruch Spinoza endorse the views of passive soft-determinism, they differ on how they understand the notion of freedom, insofar as:
  (a) Augustine says that freedom means being able to act as one chooses; Spinoza says that freedom consists in affirming one's complete determination.
  (b) Augustine says that since God determines us to be the persons we are, we are not free; Spinoza says that by affirming that we are free of God's determination, we make ourselves free.
   (c) Augustine says that we are free when we act contrary to the conditioning forces that form our personalities; Spinoza says that freedom consists in acting as our personality dictates.
  (d) Augustine says that freedom means being passive and not acting at all; Spinoza says that freedom means acting contrary to our personality or character.

62.  The Stoic philosopher Epictetus says, "To accuse others for one's own misfortunes is a sign of lack of education; to accuse oneself shows that one's education has begun; to accuse neither oneself nor others shows that one's education is complete."    Accusing oneself is only the beginning, not the completion, of education, because true freedom for the Stoic consists in recognizing how:
  (a) both our actions and our feelings or emotions about our actions are ultimately determined.
  (b) rational self-control is impossible, because it contradicts our human essence (and thus is an example of what Sartre calls "bad faith").
  (c) one's own pleasure should be the ultimate basis for judging the rationality of actions.
  (d) we do not control events in our lives, but we can control our feelings or judgments about them.

63. Even though the compatibilist version of soft determinism acknowledges that every human action has a cause, it still maintains that some acts are "free" insofar as:
  (a) the individual doing the act feels that he or she is free and that the act is done spontaneously.
 (b) nothing causes the individual to choose what she does.
 (c) so-called "free" acts are due to the person's choice or decision to do them.
 (d) the individual's acts could not have been predicted.

64. Like passive self- (or "soft"-) determinism, Aristotle's active self-determinism says that actions are free if they are voluntary.  However, his view differs from passive self-determinism insofar as he argues that:
  (a) our choices are themselves caused by external forces (e.g., environment, upbringing) over which we ultimately have no control.
  (b) we cannot be held responsible for our actions if they are the result of past choices we have made, because we cannot change the past.
  (c) just as nothing causes us to choose to be a certain kind of person or self, so nothing can cause us to act (even involuntarily) in ways other than we choose.
  (d) through our decisions we choose the kind of personality or character we have, and we are free insofar as we act based on what we choose.

65. According to Aristotle's active self-determinism, I am responsible for both my actions and my choices because I can determine the kind of character, personality, or self I have.  Critics object to this by noting that:
  (a) in active self-determinism, "I" am responsible only for my involuntary actions.
  (b) the ability to change personality is itself something over which one ultimately has no control.
  (c) once I recognize how my character has been formed by past experiences, "I" can decide to reform my self by deciding how much importance to place on such experiences.
  (d) changing one's character is possible only if one makes a firm commitment to do so.

66. In response to the soft determinist claim that freedom is not illusion, hard determinists reply:
  (a) even though nothing may cause an individual to choose to act in a particular way, he will act in a certain way anyway.
 (b) though a free act might be uncaused, a "free" choice is not uncaused.
  (c) even though free acts do not have causes, determined acts always have causes.
   (d) though a so-called "free" act might be the result of a human choice, the choice itself is the result of other external causes.

67. In defending a soft determinist stance, Hume says that a "free" action is one we normally experience as being preceded by (or "caused" by) an act of will or choice; and an action that is not done freely is one that is preceded by events other than choices.  In any event, Hume claims, it makes no sense to ask about the cause of choices, because:
  (a) the causes of our choices must be other choices, and those have other choices as causes, going back infinitely.
  (b) we have no experience of constant conjunctions of events prior to choices, and thus we cannot conclude that there is a connection in which choices are effects.
  (c) without external causes there could be no account of how choices are made and about how certain acts are not done freely.
  (d) the cause of a choice is an unknown event that occurs before we act, over which we have no control and is thus irrelevant in our decision to act.

68. "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good; nor infamy, if evil."  Here Hume is noting that:
  (a) to hold someone responsible for an action requires that we trace the action to its cause in the individual's character; the action itself cannot be held responsible.
 (b) individuals are responsible for their characters but not for their actions.
  (c) the character of a person is reflected in the kinds of actions he or she does; so no praise or blame of the person reflects on the character of the act.
  (d) we cannot draw inferences concerning actions based on the experienced association of those actions with motives, inclinations, and circumstances.

69. Which of the following IS NOT an argument against determinism?
  (a) It is possible that human freedom is a non-determined characteristic that has emerged out of a system of otherwise causally determined things.
  (b) Our experience of ourselves as free seems to be as good an argument for freedom as anything else.
  (c) Like everything else in the universe, human actions must be caused by something; nothing justifies claiming that we are exceptions to the rule.
  (d) For practical reasons like being justified in holding people morally and legally responsible for their actions, we need to reject determinism.

70. One of the major objections raised against determinism is that it cannot be shown to be false and therefore, as a theory, cannot be tested.  Why can't the theory be shown to be false?
 (a) Because its truth cannot be questioned.
 (b) Because it claims that every event has a cause.
 (c) Because objections to the theory fail to explain why people do what they do.
  (d) Because even attempted falsifications of the theory are explainable in terms of the theory (i.e., as determined).

71. In reply to the soft determinist, the hard determinist points out that the choices people make and upon which they act are functions of their personalities or characters.  But (the hard determinist replies) since one's personality or character is itself a product of environment, genetics, upbringing, etc., it still seems that people are not really free.  In order to avoid this predicament, the indeterminist proposes that truly free actions are:
  (a) best explained not in terms of causes but in terms of the person or "agent" who chooses to do the action.
 (b) spontaneous, chance, or random events uncaused by personality or choice.
  (c) caused by motions of sub-atomic particles, which themselves have certain (though unknown) causes.
 (d) actions that have specific causes, but we don't know what those causes are.

72. Though hard determinists, soft determinists, and indeterminists disagree about whether and how people can act freely, they do agree on one thing:
 (a) only actions done for reasons can count as free actions.
  (b) we should focus on the presence or absence of causes in discussing freedom.
 (c) because every act has some cause (even if it is unknown), there is no real freedom.
 (d) we cannot hold anyone responsible for free acts if those acts have causes.

73. According to the indeterminist, if an event has a specific cause or causes, it is predictable (at least in principle).  But since quantum mechanics shows that no sub-atomic particle event is in principle absolutely predictable (and is thus a random or chance event), we might be justified in thinking that "free" human actions are similar types of events.  Against this argument, critics of indeterminism reply:
  (a) a chance or random action is not be what we normally call a "free" human action.
  (b) even if human actions were absolutely predictable, we could still say that they were uncaused.
  (c) moral and religious doctrines require that we believe that people are determined, whether or not science supports such a belief.
  (d) if small-scale sub-atomic ("micro") events were predictable, that would prove that large-scale ("macro") events such as human actions are unpredictable.

74. According to William James, the question about whether we are free or determined can best be decided on pragmatic grounds.  That is, we have to decide which makes more sense:
  (a) believing that freedom is an illusion or believing that chance events (e.g., free choices) occur.
  (b) hard determinism's denial of freedom or soft determinism's qualified acceptance of freedom.
  (c) holding people responsible for their actions, or holding them responsible for their choices.
  (d) believing that regrettable actions really could have been avoided, or believing that such actions are purely random, chance events.

75. Critics of indeterminism claim that, if so-called "free" choices and actions are uncaused, unpredictable, chance events, then no one who acted freely would know beforehand what he or she was about to do.  This strikes critics as being simply wrongheaded, because if that were true, no one could justly be held responsible for his or her actions.  In response, the indeterminist might agree with the hard determinist, pointing out that:
  (a) since being responsible and being held responsible are different, we need to change how we understand just treatment to accommodate our understanding of what freedom means.
  (b) because there is really no difference between a free act and one that is causally determined, it makes no sense to hold people responsible for their actions by punishing or rewarding them.
  (c) uncaused, chance events do not really happen in nature or in human actions; it only seems like they are uncaused because they are so difficult to predict.
  (d) even if chance events occur in nature, that does not mean that they cannot be predicted based on natural laws; it is simply more difficult to do it with human beings than with other things.

76. Libertarians point out that determinism violates its own claim to scientific respectability by failing to explain what we observe.  That is, the sheer fact that determinism fails to explain what we experience daily should be enough to prove that determinism is incorrect, insofar as it proposes a theory that:
  (a) is inconsistent with other scientific theories that emphasize the role of causality in explaining behavior.
  (b) ignores the indeterminacy and randomness of sub-atomic particle physics.
  (c) acknowledges that there is a difference between human behavior and the behavior of other things despite evidence to the contrary.
  (d) denies that we engage in free choices and acts, and recommends that we accept that theory despite our daily experience to the contrary.

77.  Human behavior can be explained in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done.  This distinction between causes and reasons is concerned with the distinction between:
 (a) what someone does and what kind of character or set of habits he or she has.
 (b) the events prior to an action and the intended goals of an action.
 (c) actions that are desired and actions that are expected to yield certain consequences.
 (d) actions and choices.

78. Theories of freedom explain human behavior in terms of either the causes of an action or the reasons for which the action is done.  Which of the following theories provide rational rather than causal explanations?
  (a) Hard and soft determinism and indeterminism.
 (b) Indeterminism, compatibilism, and soft determinism.
 (c) Compatibilism and libertarianism.
 (d) Agency, person, and existentialist theories.

79. According to Sartre, the world consists of our interpretation of and response to facticity.  We are "thrown" into a situation in which everything (our selves included) must be evaluated as more or less significant.  To respond to this situation with inauthenticity or in "bad faith" is to act in a contradictory, self-refuting manner.  In this regard, bad faith is:
 (a) the choice to believe that we have no choice regarding the way the world is.
 (b) the exclusion of being-in-itelf in favor of being-for-itself.
 (c) the belief in humanistic (this-worldly) values over God-given, religious values.
 (d) the belief that our own personal choices have significance for all other people.

80. Sartre claims that, instead of saying that human beings are free, it would be more correct to say that human beings are freedom, because to say that human beings are free:
 (a) implies that freedom is a characteristic found in a determinate human essence.
  (b) ignores the fact that, for the most part, human beings are determined to act in certain definite ways because of their upbringing.
 (c) describes human beings as lacking all moral responsibility for what they become.
  (d) condemns human beings to labor under the burden of freely choosing their own nature in terms of their actions.

81. Sartre notes that, in our existential predicament, humanity can become anything it chooses.  Skinner likewise suggests that a behaviorist, deterministic, and scientific view of human beings "offers exciting possibilities.  We have not yet seen what man can make of man."  Sartre, however, would reject behaviorism because, in his view:
 (a) behaviorism denies human freedom in saying that we are controlled by environment.
  (b) existentialism may not explain the human condition as well as behaviorism, but that does mean that it is wrong.
  (c) what it means to be human is not something that is revealed by observable behavior.
  (d) behaviorism is scientific and based on observation, whereas existentialism is based on the belief that we are determined to believe that we are free.

82. According to Sartre, the claim that human existence precedes essence requires that there be no God, because if God exists and is the creator of everything in the world (including humans), then:
 (a) humans are not free to choose the kind of beings they become and are responsible for.
 (b) the cause of evil in the world is due to human action and not God's actions.
 (c) existentialism precedes essentialism as an explanation of human nature.
 (d) there is no limit on human actions or human nature, even if God creates us.

83. In the agency theory of freedom, a free act is caused by a person, but a person is not a thing before a choice is made.  Rather, a person is:
  (a) the product of environment, upbringing, genetics, and associations with family and friends.
 (b) the collection of mental states (character, habits) that cause a choice.
 (c) the result of choices, the summary of acts of giving reasons for why actions are done.
  (d) the openended possibility of there not being any cause or reason for why an action is done.

84. Theories of freedom and theories of punishment focus attention on the differences between being responsible and being held responsible for our actions.  In this regard, the theory of deterrence presumes a theory of hard determinism, insofar as (in deterrence) the purpose of punishment is:
  (a) to protect the society from dangerous individuals who freely choose to threaten others.
  (b) to change behavior by holding someone responsible whether or not he or she could have done otherwise.
  (c) to hold responsible only those individuals who are responsible for their actions.
  (d) to deter individuals from unacceptable acts when they are responsible, and to suggest how they might change their characters by teaching them to hold themselves responsible.

85. Agency, person, or existentialist theories of freedom are often invoked in support of a retributive theory of punishment because in retribution the purpose of punishment is:
  (a) to protect other members of society from someone who is perceived as a threat to society.
  (b) to protect the person being punished from external forces of environment, conditioning, or acquaintances that might affect his or her behavior.
  (c) to respect the right of the person to what he or she deserves, and that assumes that the person has control in determining his or her own choices.
  (d) to change the character or personality of the person being punished so that he or she chooses not to engage in similar objectionable behavior in the future.

86. Which of the following is an example of positive freedom?
 (a) freedom to worship and assemble.  (c) freedom to speak about one's beliefs.
 (b) freedom from governmental intrusions. (d) freedom from fear of being attacked.

 87. If freedom is understood as freedom from other people--for example, to "get away from it all" or to "find oneself"--then that requires a concept of self  that differs from one in which freedom is the ability to realize oneself through participating in relations with others.  The two concepts of self are different insofar as the first (freedom from others) emphasizes how self-identity is essentially:
  (a) social; whereas the second (freedom to realize oneself through relations with others) focuses on how self-identity is essentially individual or private.
  (b) individual or private; whereas the second (freedom to realize oneself through relations with others) focuses on how self-identity is essentially social.
  (c) neither social nor individual but rather is a function of rational freedom; whereas the second (freedom to realize oneself through relations with others) is based on emotional freedom.
  (d) both social and individual, and therefore the idea that there are two different concepts of self underlying the two notions of freedom simply misunderstands the distinction.
 

Essays:

88.  How is the difference between a causal explanation and a rational explanation of freedom similar to the difference between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist accounts of morality?

89.  How is the libertarian approach to the freedom-determinism question similar to the libertarian approach to political relations?  (Hint: the key lies in their understanding of the self.)
 

Answers:
 
 

1. B 2. A 3. A 4. A 5. A 6. B 7. A 8. B 9. B 10. B 11. B 12. B

13. A 14. A 15. B 16. B 17. A 18. B 19. A 20. B 21. B 22. A 23. A 24. B

25. A 26. B 27. A 28. A 29. B 30. A 31. A 32. A 33. B 34. B 35. A 36. A

37. B 38. A 39. B 40. B 41. B 42. A 43. A 44. A 45. A 46. B 47. A 48. C

49. A 50. C 51. D 52. C 53. B 54. B 55. C 56. B 57. A 58. C 59. A 60. D

61. A 62. D 63. C 64. D 65. B 66. D 67. B 68. A 69. C 70. D 71. B 72. B

73. A 74. A 75. A 76. D 77. B 78. D 79. A 80. A 81. A 82. A 83. C 84. B 85. C 86. D 87. B